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The Value of Alternatives:
Why the EU is Indispensable to 
Central Asian Security
Luba von Hauff 
The security risks of post-Soviet Central Asia are pronounced and therefore pres-
ent on the agendas of most international actors, including the US, Russia, and 
China. The EU is also concerned, although it has hitherto not been known for 
political success in the region, especially in terms of security. Indeed, the EU’s 
approach to the region – oriented toward transformation, liberalization, and de-
mocratization – has been largely labeled a failure, with minimal impact and prog-
ress. Against this background, this article will review and discuss the nature of the 
threats to Central Asia’s security, establish the extent of the EU’s actual “failure” by 
examining the distinct characteristics of the EU’s security approach, and, fi nally, 
refl ect on how European policy can have an impact on the local security situation 
in the future.
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Introduction
In post-Soviet Central Asia – the region spanning Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki-
stan – a host of economic and geopolitical opportunities 
come face to face with pressing security challenges. A 
region steeped in tradition, Central Asia has long served 
as a land bridge and transport route connecting Asia, the 
Middle East, and Europe. It has substantial and sought-
after raw materials at its disposal, from hydrocarbon and 
water resources to ferrous and non-ferrous metals, among 
other commodities. Moreover, the countries of Central 
Asia serve as comparatively loyal allies to the interna-
tional community in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, 
through their participation in the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN). At the same time, however, the region 
faces substantial threats to domestic and transnational 
security: flourishing transnational crime (notably arms 
and drug trafficking), governmental and social instability, 
and growing “Islamization” of the traditionally secular 
populations.1 In this regard, a pronounced role in incit-
ing regional instability is often attributed to neighboring 
Afghanistan, which has become even more fragile and 
prone to Islamic extremism since the withdrawal of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014.
Central Asia’s most influential neighbors are two of 
today’s significant non-Western powers: Russia and China. 
Although their approaches differ – Russia pursues a prom-
inent political-military role in the region, while Beijing 
focuses on the developmental aspects of security – both 
actors consider Central Asian security to be a priority, 
particularly in terms of protecting the region from pos-
sible spillover from instability to the south.2 To this end, 
both “authoritarian great powers” maintain close bi- and 
multilateral ties with Central Asia’s equally authoritar-
ian states, aiming to stabilize the local regimes – in other 
words, to consolidate the local political status quo.3
The subject of Central Asian security is important to 
the European Union as well. Like Russia and China, the 
EU regards the possibility of (Afghanistan-induced) 
Islamic extremism and the ensuing radicalization of post-
Soviet Central Asia’s traditionally secular populations 
as key threats to regional security.4 Like the strategies of 
Russia and – especially – China, moreover, the EU’s Cen-
tral Asia Strategy is marked by a developmental approach, 
with particular emphasis on building social, economic, 
and technical capacity. The EU’s progress report on 
Central Asia, echoing the Chinese approach of enhancing 
security through development, states that “EU interests 
in the Central Asian region are best served by promot-
ing comprehensive security and development, which are 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing.”5 
Despite the outward similarity of objectives (regional 
security and stability) and approaches (capacity build-
ing and socio-economic development), however, there is 
a pronounced factual discrepancy between Russian and 
Chinese engagement on the one hand, and European 
engagement on the other. This is because the EU, unlike 
Russia and China, views its efforts to create regional secu-
rity through a liberal-democratic lens, putting particular 
focus on the human dimension and the transformation 
of local authoritarian structures – something that, prima 
facie, is profoundly out of tune with the survival instincts 
of Central Asia’s post-Soviet governments and their pow-
erful neighbours.
This article explores whether and to what extent the EU’s 
distinct “transformation-oriented” approach impedes its 
security ambitions in Central Asia.6 The objective here is to 
assess the potential for European impact in a region that is in 
many ways quite adverse to the “import” of Western norms 
and to investigate whether and how the EU may contribute 
to security and help the region’s governments address local 
instability. The remainder of the analysis will elaborate on 
these issues. It will discuss threats coming from Afghanistan 
as well as locally bred dangers; put these into the context of 
the EU’s Central Asia Strategy; highlight, in turn, the latter’s 
potential for impact on local patrimonial-authoritarian struc-
tures; and, in conclusion, reflect on the European ability to 
influence the local security situation for the time to come.
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Transnational Threats in Local Perspective
The fear of regional destabilization induced by Afghani-
stan is widespread. The official Central Asian posi-
tion, especially of those countries sharing borders with 
Afghanistan, is unequivocal: militant Islamist infiltration 
is regarded as the most dangerous threat to regional 
security. And indeed, this threat should not to be un-
derestimated. Several professionally advanced Afghani-
stan- and Pakistan-based terrorist groups are focused 
on Central Asia and active in the greater region. These 
include Jund al-Khilafa, the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan (IMU), and the Islamic Jihadist Union (IJU), among 
others. As the infiltrations into Tajikistan in 2009–10, the 
attacks in Kazakh cities in 2011, and the suicide bombing 
in northern Tajikistan in 2013 have demonstrated, radi-
cal groups, most of them based in Afghanistan, could 
pose a real threat to Central Asia – through incursions as 
well as through local cells, which are most prevalent in 
the northern provinces of Tajikistan but are also present 
elsewhere in the region.7
Central Asia’s governments also regard the continuous-
ly growing prominence of Islam among the region’s secu-
lar populations through the prism of Afghanistan-induced 
threats. To be sure, the extent of this “Islamization” varies 
considerably in the respective states. The Tajik and Uzbek 
peoples have traditionally been more devout than their 
formerly nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz neighbors, and they 
remain so today. Nevertheless, a general trend is present: 
more than two decades after the end of the Soviet Union, 
the recourse of the region’s societies to “authentic” Is-
lamic norms and rules to structure their day-to-day lives 
is effectively increasing.8 While here, too, the factor of 
Afghanistan should not be underestimated, the growing 
popularity of Islamic teachings should be assessed within 
the local, Central Asian, context as well. This is because 
it is at the domestic level that outside influences can be 
embraced or repelled – the dissemination of ideas only 
works in a locally receptive environment. Receptivity, in 
turn, represents a function of the state-society relation-
ship, which in Central Asia’s case is problematic because 
highly exclusive in nature.
Indeed, political power in today’s Central Asia remains 
weakly institutionalized, which means that although 
state institutions are present they are often bypassed 
when it comes to decision making. Instead, power is ex-
ercised in a vertical and informal manner, often through 
the personal relationships of a nation’s leader. Hence, the 
political systems of all Central Asian nations are char-
acterized by a pronounced weakness of the rule of law 
and, accordingly, by a high degree of corruption – that 
is, by the distribution of state resources (administrative 
status as well as financial means) in exchange for loyalty. 
Such systems require a strong – by Western standards, 
authoritarian – leader, who is accepted as a credible and 
legitimate interlocutor among the “elites” (those interest 
groups through which power is exercised) and, impor-
tantly, a population that is closely tied to, and controlled 
by, the state. Indeed, a state-controlled population is an 
important systemic prerequisite, because an independent 
and self-organized civil society would disturb and thus 
endanger the distributional processes within the patrimo-
nial system, and with it, its “stability.” It is this point – the 
local elites’ understanding of “stability” as the regime’s 
control over state institutions, state resources, and society 
– that underlines the legacy (and continued presence) of 
Soviet political culture.9
The systematic exclusion as practiced by Central Asia’s 
regimes alienates the population and creates a breeding 
ground for social instability – for social, economic, as 
well as political-ideological reasons. Indeed, in spite of a 
slight elevation of the consumption-related standard of 
living since the region’s countries achieved independence 
from the USSR, citizens, especially outside energy-rich 
Kazakhstan, have suffered from a deterioration of basic 
state services such as education, (affordable) health 
care, social protection, and adequate housing, among 
other things. They have witnessed the decay of Central 
Asia’s old, Soviet-installed infrastructure, which has not 
been adequately replaced – from schools and hospitals 
to roads.10 Lastly, and with the qualified exception of Ka-
zakhstan, the region’s governments, functioning within 
their fenced-off, patrimonial structures, have largely 
failed to provide a political-ideological vision for domestic 
development that can inspire hope for and trust in a bet-
ter future. All of this has contributed to a declining sense 
of government legitimacy within the local populations 
and, in turn, fanned social upheaval across the region – in 
Kyrgyzstan (2005; 2010), Uzbekistan (2005), Kazakhstan 
(2011), and Tajikistan (2010, 2012). Indeed, while their re-
spective domestic backgrounds differ, all these instances 
of unrest share two factors: dysfunctional state-society 
relationships, and the population’s desire (as yet preva-
lently secularly motivated) for structural transformation 
and socio-economic and political inclusion.
It is precisely against this background that the issue 
of “Islamization” of local populations needs to be viewed. 
Indeed, dissatisfaction with incumbent power structures 
has not only heightened the propensity toward (violent) 
protests but also the attractiveness of alternative –  
Islamic – models of social and political organization. In 
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other words, weak rule of law, socio-economic depriva-
tion, and political repression have fuelled the demand 
within society for genuinely binding norms, guidelines, 
and rules, thus increasing the receptivity to numerous 
aspects of Islamic teachings, including the non-spiritual 
ones. For these reasons, a second post-Soviet wave of 
“Islamic revival” has been taking place throughout the 
region.11 It takes various forms, from spiritual pursuits to 
welfare- and community-oriented projects to politically 
driven activism. To a significant extent, this revival has 
taken place outside of the official, government-sponsored 
religious sphere, as illustrated by the growing number 
of semi-legal and underground Islamic charities, educa-
tional facilities, NGOs, and even political groups on the 
ground.12
While not a danger per se, societal “Islamization” may 
eventually exacerbate the risk of regional instability in 
conjunction with local populations’ sense of alienation 
from the state, as socio-economic and ideological vacu-
ums may be filled by alternatives – by Islamic groups, 
for example, that provide vital social, educational, and 
economic assistance to those parts of society that are (or 
feel) neglected by the local political structures.13 In other 
words, the local sense of alienation may yield the very 
socio-economic grievances that are eventually taken up 
by religiously-politically driven “alternative” groups, who 
adapt their strategies to each country’s respective prob-
lems.14 It is thus that, in the mind-sets of local citizens, 
significant areas of government responsibility – in terms 
of state and, especially, of nation building – may start to 
recede.15
At this point, the circle between the dangers posed 
by Afghanistan and the behavior of the region’s regimes 
closes – highlighting the extent to which the actions of 
the latter can in fact determine the degree to which exter-
nally induced religious-ideological threats may become 
entrenched at a local level. To be sure, Afghanistan’s 
contribution to Central Asian instability should not be 
underestimated, as there are obvious geographic, ethnic, 
(illicit) economic, and some new ideological-religious 
connections.16 Above all, however, the repressiveness and 
corruption of Central Asian regimes actively contribute to 
creating regional instability. By largely inspiring feelings 
of exclusion and alienation among the region’s popula-
tions, they pave the way for social (violent) radicalization 
– be that radicalization “imported” from Afghanistan or 
home grown. This is especially this case in the more de-
vout and repressed societies of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Therefore: the threat from Afghanistan is undoubtedly 
real, but it is at the local level that transnational threats 
will succeed or fail to take hold. In consequence, for the 
time to come, the threat of radical extremism emanating 
from Afghanistan will only be as dangerous as the Cen-
tral Asian regimes allow it to be.
The EU in Central Asia:  
A Policy of “No Impact”?
Considering the degree to which citizens’ dissatisfac-
tion with the effectiveness of local governments fuels its 
susceptibility to radical, extremist alternatives, the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to Central Asian security is in 
fact of significant value. The EU Central Asia Strategy 
provides cooperation mechanisms and builds capacity in 
specialized areas such as border management (BOMCA) 
and trafficking (CADAP). More importantly, it emphasizes 
the human dimension of security, promoting initiatives 
to strengthen the functionality of Central Asian states 
and, with it, stability – in the European sense of the word. 
To this end, the strategy’s approach is multipronged: to 
support development of formal state institutions through 
the EU Rule of Law Initiative; to promote socio-economic 
development through specialized education, infrastruc-
ture, and environmental programs as well as through 
enhanced economic cooperation; to encourage social 
activism through the EU-Central Asia Human Rights 
Dialogue and support local civil society organizations, 
establishing mechanisms for exchange with their local 
representatives.17 In short, the EU’s approach addresses 
the social aspects of (in)security, pointing to the links 
between government behavior, societal inclusion, and 
stability, and providing instruments for improvement.
The local regimes have thus far shunned the EU-
proposed path of structural transformation – at least in 
measurable terms.18 Instead, they have shown a marked 
preference for the approaches promoted by Russia and 
China, which emphasize regime security over good 
governance. Following the Chinese and Russian line 
allows Central Asia’s current regimes to maintain their 
traditional patrimonial-authoritarian structures while 
enjoying significant infrastructure investments – with no 
(politically transformative) strings attached. This appar-
ent rejection of the EU’s approach has prompted some EU 
observers to criticize Brussels for “failing to leave a mark” 
on the region’s security architecture.19 Such disappoint-
ment, however, is premature; the EU’s policy of long-term 
stabilization is more than a function of linear socio-
economic and political progress. Put differently, the lack 
of measurable progress in internationally set governance 
indicators does not rule out the effectiveness of EU policy 
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in the long term, for the approach also promotes specific 
aspects that cannot easily be measured to be included in 
international rankings. In this regard, the extent to which 
local populations feel involved in the political process 
– that is, their perception of the state-society relation-
ship – is particularly salient. And indeed, there have been 
limited but significant changes echoing the expectations 
of the EU over the past years, at least in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the region’s more open nations.
In Kyrgyzstan since 2010 – that is, after the ouster of 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev and the outbreak of severe ethnic 
clashes – the government has largely resisted the urge to 
clamp down on social activists (a practice all too familiar 
from Soviet times). Though the country maintains its 
traditionally poor record on all other indicators of good 
governance, this is still an encouraging sign. To be sure, 
Kyrgyz civil society has been and remains vulnerable to 
occasional legislative attacks and intimidation by security 
services, especially in the sensitive field of ethnic rela-
tions. At the same time, NGOs have been increasingly 
able to respond to harassment, “whether by acting locally 
or communicating their grievances to the international 
community.”20 In spite of occasional setbacks, Kyrgyz civil 
society has thus been relatively successful in strengthen-
ing its presence within the country’s generally fragile 
political system – providing channels for the majority 
population to call attention to and seek governmental 
remedies for their grievances on the ground.21 This would 
not have been possible without the tacit acceptance of the 
government.
The relationship between the Kazakh state and Kazakh 
civil society has experienced a different, albeit still con-
structive dynamic in terms of developing a more viable 
– inclusive – state-society relationship. To be sure, since 
the Zhanaozen riots in 2011, the government has been 
following the pattern learned during Soviet times of in-
creasing state control over society, rendering independent 
activism in sensitive policy realms ever more limited.22 
However, it simultaneously enhanced the room and fi-
nancial support for civil engagement in those areas that it 
deemed politically “safe.” Accordingly, it has increasingly 
summoned domestic organizations – often referred to 
as GONGOs (“government-organized non-governmental 
organizations”) – to address a substantial number of 
social, economic, ethnic, and also environment-related 
grievances that abound on the ground.23 While it clearly 
failed to enhance individual political freedom, this policy 
nonetheless contributed to enhancing the public’s general 
perception of being included. What is more, in 2013, the 
Kazakh government developed a state program for “fight-
ing religious extremism and terrorism,” which empha-
sized the necessity of involving Kazakh citizens in this 
process. More concretely, the intent here was to shore up 
the “civil position” of the “Kazakh people” against radical 
ideologies by improving state-society dialogue and public 
education.24 Despite its extensive top-down approach and 
the fact that it was a largely rhetorical gesture, this strat-
egy marked the government’s first instance of admitting 
society into the hitherto exclusively governmental realm 
of security.
The Kyrgyz and Kazakh regimes have thus been imple-
menting domestic measures to reduce societal exclusion 
in past years, trying to improve state-society relations 
and, with it, the security outlook. By Western standards 
such measures were certainly flawed; they were largely 
state-controlled, had little impact on policy making or 
on the extent of local socio-economic deprivation, and 
were accompanied by restrictive government measures in 
other social realms.25 And yet, they did (and do) actively 
address some social grievances, providing channels for 
citizens to voice (limited) dissent and opposition as well 
as to seek remedies. In this way, and from a local point 
of view, these European-inspired measures enhanced 
societal visibility and bestowed a more positive dynamic 
on the state-society relationship. The comparatively high 
resilience of Kyrgyz and Kazakh societies toward politi-
cally motivated Islamic movements and the prevalence of 
moderate, non-political, welfare- and community-  
oriented groups testify to this, demonstrating that the 
idea of security as a function of the governments’ treat-
ment of society has been heard.
The EU’s Role in Central Asian Security: 
Which Way Forward?
“Russia has political-military leverage in Central Asia. 
China brings in considerable investment. What does Eu-
rope have?” This question was asked during a conference 
exploring the EU’s role in Central Asia’s post-2014 security 
architecture. Suggestive as it was, it highlighted one point 
in particular: the EU has neither the power-political clout 
of Russia and China nor can it spare the institutional 
mechanisms and financial resources of these countries. 
It therefore cannot promote geopolitical imperatives in 
the region to the same extent that Moscow and Beijing 
can. This does not mean, however, that the EU has no role 
whatsoever in the region’s security. Quite the opposite. 
The EU can have a distinct impact on Central Asian secu-
rity – although its policy is widely perceived as ineffective 
in measurable terms. It can provide alternatives. 
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Indeed, the presence of the EU in Central Asia, espe-
cially within the format of the Human Rights Dialogue 
and the Rule of Law Initiative, allows local governments 
to get acquainted with new approaches and reconsider 
security challenges from perspectives they do not get to 
see in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and oth-
er regional forums. For example, it allows them to culti-
vate the linkage between state behavior and security, and 
to develop national policies that take these new insights 
into account. Here the EU has been successful, at least in 
part. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, some aspects of the 
EU approach have been taken into account as solutions to 
local problems – in spite of their apparent incompatibility 
with domestic realities. It remains to be seen whether 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments’ tentative change 
of mind will influence the more repressive governments 
of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where the populations are 
traditionally more devout and hence – due to the combi-
nation of religiosity and government repression – more 
receptive to radical Islamic alternatives. Nevertheless, the 
first incremental steps toward more constructive state-
society relations have been made in the region – at least 
in two Central Asian states. This may in turn facilitate 
similar changes in the region as a whole.
However, the extent and sustainability of EU influ-
ence not only depend on the willingness of Central 
Asia’s governments to undertake reforms, but also – and 
significantly – on Brussels’s willingness to approach the 
local regimes in a more mindful way in terms of the re-
gion’s political legacy and also in terms of the constraints 
induced by its vicinity. Brussels needs to invest more time 
and resources into explaining the usefulness of structural 
transformation and with it, the uses of political liberaliza-
tion in general. Local governments will struggle to listen 
to EU measures – and especially to implement them – if 
they do not understand their actual value and utility. In 
this regard, local governments would not regard the cre-
ation of closer partnerships with the EU as a significant 
incentive for undertaking transformation. This is not only 
because any closer partnership with the EU lacks the op-
tion of eventual accession to the Union, but also because 
these countries already have strong bilateral economic 
ties to individual EU member states (especially in the case 
of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); because 
EU funds have flowed into the region despite minimal 
progress on the ground (especially in the case of Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan); and not least because of China’s 
pronounced (and growing) economic presence in the 
region.26 In other words, the EU must be even more vigor-
ous about highlighting the fundamental linkage between 
structural transformation, the state-society relationship, 
and security.
In addition to explaining the value of structural trans-
formation, the EU should adjust its expectations to reflect 
the region’s actual structural and geopolitical capabilities. 
It should allow for the “localization” of its ideas – for the 
local construction of locally acceptable forms of socio-
political inclusion (and other concepts). Indeed, it is the 
process of translating a foreign norm into a particular 
domestic context that enhances that norm’s domestic 
legitimacy – its embeddedness within the system, if you 
will – and thus also enhances the openness of local au-
thorities to further experiences with other norms. Accept-
ing localization, in turn, requires Brussels’s reevaluation 
of what constitutes “success” and “failure” when dealing 
with Central Asia’s post-Soviet autocracies. That is, it 
depends on a better differentiation between the realiza-
tion of EU benchmarks on the one hand and the genuine 
encouragement of “locally owned” transformation on 
the other. Put differently, European actors and observers 
will need to accept that a lack of domestic change of the 
sort expected in the West need not necessarily imply that 
the European understanding of security as a whole has 
failed to resonate with Central Asia’s regimes. Rather, as 
the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan suggest, it may 
resonate in a different – Central Asian – manner, and 
still, quietly, contribute to a better climate between the 
state and society and thus to an improved local security 
environment. 
To conclude, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh cases show that 
Central Asia’s states are not immune to transformation, 
even though it takes forms that differ from what Western 
observers and policy makers expect. These governments 
have adjusted the European understanding of human se-
curity (and the inherent notion of socio-political inclusion) 
to meet local (governmental) sensitivities and needs. They 
have translated a European idea into their local contexts 
and developed a Central Asian model of inclusiveness 
aiming at a locally “appropriate” improvement of the state-
society relationship – one that resonates with the local po-
litical culture, which is in many respects still shaped by the 
Soviet experience. In other words, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh 
governments engaged in the localization of (parts of) the 
European understanding of security: they complemented 
their existing, authoritarian-patrimonial political frame-
work with a new option, which they considered potentially 
stabilizing – enhanced social inclusion – without threat-
ening the security of their regimes through short-term 
fundamental socio-political transformation.
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It is at this point that the limits as well as the actual 
value of EU engagement in Central Asia crystallize – espe-
cially vis-à-vis Russia’s and China’s “stabilizing” engage-
ment. Due to the constraints of political structures and 
vicinity, the EU’s impact on local security through socio- 
political transformation is bound to be rather low – at 
least in measurable terms and in the short term. Never-
theless, EU presence in the region is of significant value, 
as it endows local regimes, especially those that are 
more open to the diffusion of norms, with more than just 
benchmarks for “appropriate behavior”; it provides alter-
native options for dealing with long-known problems – 
options that the Central Asian governments are not likely 
to learn from their neighbors Russia and China, who are 
far more interested in promoting the status quo and, in 
doing so, actually fail to promote long-term regional secu-
rity, at least from a Western point of view.
The European understanding of security emphasizes 
the link between state behavior and security outcomes. 
It also highlights the correlation between socio-political 
inclusion, the resilience of society, and the potential for 
(foreign) radical ideologies to gain a foothold within the 
region’s traditionally largely secular societies. In this, the 
European approach not only addresses a root cause of 
Central Asian instability but, importantly, also contrib-
utes to raising post-Soviet governments’ awareness about 
the human dimension of regional (in)security and their 
own responsibilities in this regard. And it is this aware-
ness that is most urgently needed if Central Asia is to 
achieve security in the long term – with and without the 
dangers emanating from Afghanistan.
Luba von Hauff is an associate fellow at the DGAP’s Rob-
ert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, 
and Central Asia. Contact: hauff@dgap.org
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